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K Y B E R N E T I K A — V O L U M E 12 (1976), NUMBER 6 
Suggestion of a Cooperative Market Model 
MILAN MAREŠ 
This paper deals with a free exchange market. It suggests a modification of such market model 
which reflects the cooperation between agents. Also a modified equilibrium model for such market 
is defined, and analogies of fundamental theorems about connections between market equili-
brium and game-theoretical solutions are introduced. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The market models investigated in known literature deal with the bargaining 
between agents during the exchange process. Moreover, they use the apparatus 
of cooperative game-theory, especially the concept of core, and also many important 
results about mutual connections between markets and cooperative games are 
introduced there. However, in their nature, these models are not cooperative in the 
sense that agents do not correlate their behaviour in order to maximize some common 
profit, and to increase their individual income by means of rational dealing in such 
group profit. 
There exists, already, a mathematical branch, namely cooperative games theory, 
in which many strong results concerning cooperative behaviour were obtained/This 
paper brings a suggestion how to modify the market and equilibrium model in order 
to introduce in it the cooperation in an explicite form. There are many models of 
cooperation in game theory. The one of them which was chosen for being investigated 
here is the model of games with side-payments. It is a simple model but, consequently, 
also very lucid one, giving a lot of elegant results proper for direct application. It 
is not difficult to see that also others, more complicated, game models without 
side-payments could be used for an analogical transposition into market theory, 
and that many fundamental results would keep valid. Nevertheless, it would be 
connected with introducing and developing of much more complicated and extensive 
formal aparatus, which was the main reason why it was not done here. 
The cooperative games with side-payments which are mentioned in this paper 
are familiar for all who are interested in game-theory, but, may be, some of their 
principal ideas could be rather strange for other readers. For them the main principles 
of these games are briefly mentioned here. 
First of all we have to accept the transferability of utility in such games. It means 
that the players may to transmit their utility among partners in the some coalition. 
Then, also, any rational coalition proceeds as one collective player with one common 
strategy tending to maximize the total utility of all its members. Then the final 
obtained utility is re-distributed among players in such way that all reasonable 
individual demands are respected. In this way the profit of all members of coalition 
is as big as possible in the coalition, and it is, moreover, greater than their individual 
guaranted profit achievable without cooperation. 
The same attitude is applied in this paper concerning the cooperative market. 
We assume that agents may form coalitions and cooperate inside them. They may 
gather their goods and money together and realize the exchange process with anti-
coalition using all the common goods. Also inside the coalition they exchange the real 
goods (not money) in order to maximize the common profit. The cooperation inside 
coalition is so strong that the exchange process among coalition partners is not 
limited by prices of goods. At the end of the exchange process they, by means of 
money, re-distribute the common profit among them in such way that everyone gets 
at least the utility which he had before cooperation. This model of agents behaviour 
causes a modification of the equilibrium. Any equilibrium in this cooperative market 
must respect not the possibilities of single agents (their budget-sets and initial commo-
dity bundles) but, it has to reflect the possibilities of some class of coalitions. Namely, 
it will be the class of coalitions which are in some sense admissible in the given 
market situation; i.e. which are allowed (by anti-trust laws, e.g.) or which may appear 
according to usual manners of behaviour in the considered market. 
The procedure described above is acceptable and understandable but it requests 
the fulfilling of a few conditions. The main of them is that there must exist some 
general representant of utility. We shall call it "money". The game-theoretical 
results concerning cooperative games with side-payments were obtained under the 
assumption that the general representant of utility has the same common utility 
for all players and that it is linear. Simply, the game-theoretical results were obtained 
under the assumption that the utility of money is the same for all players and that 
it is equal to their nominal value, i.e. to their quantity. For the game-theoretical 
investigation, where the direct economical application is not so immediate, this 
assumption makes no troubles. However, economical models deal with rather more 
general idea about the utility of money, and the game-theoretical simple assump-
tion can cause some embarassments. 
Nevertheless, we keep the assumption about the linear and common utility of 
money even in this paper. There are the following reasons for such decision. This 
paper should point at some ways of finding more connections between cooperative 
games and markets, and not to modify a wide part of games theory, what would be 
necessary in the other case. It is also probable that most of results which could be 
obtained for the presented model keep valid even for rather generalized utilities of 
money (e.g. linear but not the same for all players). Only the preparatory formal 
tools proving such results would be much more complicated and their detailed 
elaboration could cover the main purpose of this work. 
2. COOPERATIVE MARKET 
It is useful to introduce a few auxiliary symbols used during the paper. Let m be 
a positive integer, then R, R+, R
m and R'+ denote the sets of all real numbers, non-
negative real numbers, m-dimensional real-valued vectors and /n-dimensional 
real-valued vectors with non-negative coordinates, respectively. If Jt is a class 
of sets then we denote 
\}J4 = {i:3(KeJ£)ieK}, 
and we say that Jl is a partition of some set M if U Jt — M and K n L = 0 for 
K, LB Ji,K 4= L. Further, we denote 
< ^ > = {K e Ji : if <£ c Ji, £ is a partition of K, then & = {K}}. 
Let us consider the following objects: a non-empty finite set / , continuous mappings 
U(, i el, from R'" into R, and real-valued vectors a' = (a0, a\, ..., am) e R x R + , 
i e I. Then the quadruple 
(1) m = ( / ,RxR ' + , (U i ) i s ; , ( f lO f e / ) 
is called a market. Set / is the set of agents, we shall call them also players. We 
suppose that there is money and m kinds of regular goods in the considered market. 
Each real-valued vector x = (x0, xu ..., x,„) e R x R'" represents x0 units of money 
and xp j = 1, . . . , m, units of other goods. Vectors a' e R x R'", i el, represent 
the initial distribution of money and goods among players. The mappings U; : R+ -» 
-» R, i el, express the utilities of goods for players. 
We denote by JT the class of all non-empty subsets of L Elements from X~ are 
called coalitions. The mappings ut : R x R'" -» R, i el, such that 
Ui(x0, Xy, . . ., X,„) = A'0 + U;(Xi, • • ., X,„) , 
i e I, (x0, Xy, . . •, x,„) e R x R'"', 
are called utility functions of players. The assumption of linear utility of money, 
used here, was already discussed in Introduction. It is rather strong but useful for 
further explanation, and it is used, e.g., even in some parts of [4]. 
442 In order to simplify further notation, we denote the amounts of money and goods 
belonging to players as 
X = (x%j , x' e R x R"l , 
and 
(2) X ={X= (x%j :xleR x R"l, iel}, 
(3) XK = {XeX:Yjx
i^ £ «'} , Ke.if. 
ieK ieK 
All goods, even money, have their prices. We denote them byp = (p0, pt, .. ., p„), 
and by JP we denote the set of all price vectors. We suppose that P a R'"+' and 
always pj > 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , m. 
In the whole paper we assume that prices form row vectors from P and that 
quantities of money and goods form the column vectors from R x R'",' so that 
the scalar product px, peP, xeR x R + , may be considered. Then we denote 
(4) AK(p) = { X e X : Y > j t ' ^ X p a ' } , peP, K e J f . 
ieK ieK 
Lemma 1. Let K e Jf, peP, and let us denote uK the mapping from X into R 
such that 
«it{*) = I ",(*')> X=(x%eJeX. 
ieK 
then there exist the maxima 
max {uK(X) : X e XK} and max {uK(X) : X e AK(p)} . 
Proof . Let us denote for any X = (x')iel e X by 
(5) X* - (**')„, 
the quantities of goods, for which 
x*leR1, x*' = x'j, j=],...,m; i.e. x' = (x0, x*
1). iel. 
Then we write for any Ke Jf,pe P 
(6) X* = {X* = (x*%t: 3(X = (x%, e XK) V(i e K), x< = (x'0, **')} , 
(7) At(p) = {X* = (**%,: 3(X - (x%Bl e AK(p)) V(i e K) , x
l = (x0, x*')} , 
and 
(8) uK(X) = Y>4 + UK(X*), where UK(X*) = YUt(x*'), XeX, 
ieK ieK 
uK may be considered as a continuous mapping from jRO"*) into R, where k is number 443 




(10) ! > } = = I a ] , xj = 0 , for all ; = 1, . . . , m , ieK. 
ieK ieK 
It means that there exists 
max {UK(X*) : X* e X*} , 
and, according to (8) and (9), also the maximum of «K on X -̂. Analogously, for 
any X e AK(p), 
01) I P * 1 = Pol4 + lPAZxi) § Zp«' , 
ieK ieK / = 1 ieK ,eK 
so that 
(12) Z 4 =S — !]/»«' - w h e r e Po > 0 . 
ieK p0 ieK 
Further, for X e AK(p) also 
(13) Z PJ E xj g Z p«f - p0 Z *S, 
./ = 1 ieK ieK ieK 
as follows from (11). The positivity of pp j = 0, 1, . . . , m, and the assumption 
Xj = 0, j = 1, . . . , m, imply that AK(p) n ^
(+4 ) is a compact subset of X*, 
and the maximum of UK on AK(p) exists. This, together with (8) and (12), proves the 
existence of the maximum of uK on AK(p). 
The state of market in any moment of the exchange process can be described in 
a sufficient way by the amount of goods owned by agents, and by the prices which 
are prescribed to them. So, we call the pair 
(14) (X,p), XeX, peP, 
a market state, and we study its properties in the considered market. 
3. EQUILIBRIUM 
The main goal of this section is to introduce a modified concept of equilibrium. 
Such modification ought to fulfill two principal properties. First — it should repre-
sent the possibility of collaboration among agents, i.e. it should reflect the coalitions 
forming. Second — it should be possible to modify that equilibrium in some degree 
into stronger or weaker forms according to the actual properties of the given market. 
These two properties can be realized in such way that the modified equilibrium 
does not respect the demands of all single agents, but it does so for some class of 
their coalitions. That class may be wider or very limited, and it may contain "small" 
coalitions or the large ones., up to the situation in any given market. 
The concept of equilibrium, suggested in the following definition, fulfills the condi-
tions formulated above. 
Definition 1. Let Jt <= jf , X = (x')ieJ e X, p e P. We call the market state (X, p) 
an Jt'-equilibrium if Xe Xf, and for any K e Jt 
(15) XeAK(p), 
(16) X «<(*') = max { X M,(y) : Y = (y%sl e AK(p)} . 
isK izK 
In any market m there exists at least one non-empty class Jt <= J f for which the 
^•-equilibrium does exist, as follows from the next theorem. 
Theorem 1. If Jt = {/} is one-element class of coalitions containing exactly the 
coalition of all players, and if p e P is an arbitrary price vector then there always 
exists XeX such that (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium. 
Proof . It follows immediately from (3) and (4) that X7 n Aj(p) #= 0. If we keep 
the notation introduced in proof of Lemma 1, we may use (6) and (7), as well as 
(10), (13) (where we substitute K = j~). It means that Xf n Af(p) is a compact subset 
of R(+ "\ where n is the number of agents in I. Consequently, the continuous function 
Uj-.Xf -> R defined by (8) has its maximum on the set X* n Af(p). The desired 
assertion follows immediately from this fact and from relations (8), (9) and (12) 
for K = I and 
ut(x) = i M|(*0 - £ 4 + ut(x*) = E xj, + E t!.(**0 • 
isl iel iel iel 
Lemma 2. Let p e P, Ke Jf, and let f c Jf be a partition of K. Then for all 
X=(x%IeAK(p) 
(17) £ «<(*'•) = Y, max { £ u;(j>;) : F = (y%eI e A}(p)} . ' 
i&K Jef isJ 
Proof. Let there exists X = (x')ieIe AK(p) such that (17) is not true. We can 
redistribute the money among members of K constructing Z = (z')ieI such that 
z' = x', i e l - K , 
' z) ->*/ > i eK , j = 1, . . . , m , 
z'0 = x0 + di, ieK, d, e R , 445 
where dt are such that 
Ztl. = o, 
inK 
(18) £ "<(*0 < max { £ M;(j') : F = fc")« 6 A,(/»)} 
for all / e / . Then Z e Aĵ p), as 
E/^' = £/>*', 
iєK řєK 
and there exists at least one J e f such that Z e A7(p), as 
E UP? = UP? = E/'-' = E E/>a' • 
J e / ieJ ieK ieK Jef ieJ 
This contradicts to (18) and, consequently, (17) holds for all x e AK(p). 
Lemma 3. LetpeP, Ji <= jf, (J/y be a partition of 7. Let Xe Aj(p) for all J e 
Then X e AK(p) for all KeJl. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from 
E/«'= E YPX'= E E/",i = E/'«'-
ieK Je<J/>,J<=K ieJ Je<M>,3 = K ieJ ieK 
Lemma 4. Let />el, y// c X, <^#> be a partition of 7, and let X = (x;),e/ e X. If 
X U;(*
;) = max { £ « / / ) : F = (/) i 6 / e A,(p)} 
ieJ ieJ 
for all J e <.///> then also 
E ",(*0 = m a x ( E ".(/) : F = (.vOte/ 6 AK(p)} 
isK ieK 
for all K e „//. 
Proof. If we consider the class / = {7eJf : J c K , Je {JO}, KeJf, then 
Lemma 2 immediately implies that 
max { £ « / / ) : r e A*(»} Z 
ieK 
^ X max{£M i(y):yeAX/»)}, 
Je<Jt>,J<=K ieJ 
and the statement is proved. 
After having proved these lemmas we may introduce a few of simple results con-
cerning the equilibrium defined above. Some further results concerning that equi-
librium are given in [7], too. 
446 We denote by J the set of all one-element coalitions in the considered market; 
in symbols 
(19) • * - « $ } « . 
The concept of equilibrium investigated e.g. in [4] is identical with an J^-equilibrium 
in the terminology of this paper. 
Theorem 2. Let Jt c X, X e X, p e P. If (X, p) is an J^-equilibrium then it is 
also an ^-equilibrium. 
Proof . J is apartition of l a n d J = < X >.If(X,p)isan J^-equiHbrium then Lemma 
3 and Lemma 4 imply that it is a Jf-equilibrium and, by Definition 1, it is also an 
^-equilibrium for all Jt c X. 
Corollary 1. If J c Jt <= X, Xe X, p e P then (X,p) is an ^-equilibrium if 
and only if it is an J^-equilibrium. 
Corollary 2. If J c Jt c X, J c JT c X and if Xe X. peP then (X, p) is 
an ^-equilibrium if and only if it is an yV-equilibrium. 
Corollary 3. If J c Jt c X then any market state (X, p) is an ^-equilibrium 
(or, especially, a Jf-equilibrium) if and only if it is a competitive equilibrium in the 
sense of [4]. 
4. COALITION-GAME CONNECTED WITH A MARKET 
It was said in the introductory section of this paper that the usual concept of 
equilibrium, in its nature, is not cooperative. Nevertheless, there exist some features 
of that model which led to certain results concerning the mutual analogy between 
market and game-theoretical concepts. Namely, the analogy between equilibrium 
and game-theoretical core was investigated, and very interesting and useful results 
were obtained. 
The main purpose of this section is to show that these results are of more general 
nature, and they are true, after some modification, even for our concept of equi-
librium. Moreover, the coalition-games theory suggested, except the well-known 
core, even some other, weaker, solutions. Here, we shall investigate the connection 
between the concept of ^-equilibrium and certain class of such game-theoretical 
solutions. 
First of all we introduce a useful notion. Lemma I enables us to define a mapping 
i) : X -*• R such that for any K e X is 
(20) v{K) = max { £ «,{*') : X - ( x % , e XK} . 
ieK 
For this mapping the following statement is true. 
Lemma 5. The mapping v defined by (20) is superadditive, it means that v(K w L) = 447 
= v(K) + v(L) for any K, Le jf, K n L = 0. 
Proof . Let K, Le Jf, K n L= 0, let X = (JC*)W e XK and F = (/ ' ) t e I e XL be 
such that 
v(K) = ^ut(x'), <L) = E « ; ( y ) . 
ieK ieL 
Then there exists Z = (z%/ £ X such that z! = x' for i e K, zl = y' for i e L. More-
over, Z e XX u L , as X e XK, Ye XK and K n L= Q. For this Z 
e<* u L) = max { X "i(5') : % = (£%z e XA.U J ^ 
isKuZ. 
= S "i(z') = < * ) + <L). 
ieKwL 
We accept the usual game-theoretical terminology and we call an imputation 
any real-valued vector { = (<f )fe/, £' e R, such that there exists X = (x
l)iEl e X for 
which {' = ut(x') for any iel. The following auxiliary symbols enable us to 
simplify the further explanation. 
(21) 3 = {£ = ( £ % , : 3 ( l e X) V(f e /) »,{*') = £'} , 
(22) SK = {{ e 3 : 3(X6 XK) V(/ € /) «,(*<) = c'} , K e JT , 
If m = (/, R x R™, (U;);eJ, (a
1)iei) is a market then the pair Lm = (/, v), where v 
is defined by (20), is called a coalition-game connected with the marked m, and the 
mapping v is called the characteristic function of the game Lm. 
Many concepts and results, well-known in the coalition-games theory, are true 
even for the game Lm. The close relation between market m and game Lm enables us 
to apply those results also in the investigation of market. 
The set of imputations Q defined by 
(23) 0 = { { : { e S J , V(K e c€) £ «?
l
 = v(K)} 
ieK 
is called the core of the game Tm. 
There exists an important relation between equilibrium and core, investigated, 
e.g., in [4] and generalized in [8], namely the following one. If (X, p), X = (x')iEl, 
p e P, is an equilibrium in the classical sense (i.e. it is an ./-equilibrium in the termino-
logy of this paper) and if t, = ( f ) y e 3 is such that £' = «,(*'), i el, then f e f i 
in the game rm connected with considered market m. The concept of .^-equilibrium 
defined in this paper represents a weaker form of equilibrium. Then we may ask 
whether some weaker form of core can be defined, too. The answer is positive. There 
are many weaker concepts of game solutions given in the literature, e.g. in [3], [1] 
or [2]. One of them, suggested by author in [2], is of the form that it substitutes 
a class Ji c J T for X in formula (23). Other solutions are defined in another way, 
but they can be, at least approximately, described by formulas analogous to (23) 
with some class Jf c jf instead of Jt. None of the solutions mentioned above is 
completely satisfactory for all cases of actual games appearing in real applications. 
It means that we may expect the appearance of some new solutions based, may be, 
also on the principle that they will be defined as sets of imputations analogous to Q, 
where the class X in (23) will be substituted by some Jt c jf . All game-theoretical 
solutions of this general type are closely related to the market ^-equilibria and it is 
worth formulating their intuitive description by the following exact definition. 
Definition 2. Let Tm be a coalition-game, let Jt c j<f and S,e3. Then we say that 
£, is Jt-stable if £, e 3r and 
£ V £ v(K) for all KeJt. 
isK 
The set of all -//-stable imputations in Fm will be denoted by QM. 
Remark 1. It is obvious from Definition 2 and (23) that Q — Qx. 
The relation between ^//-equilibria and -#-stable imputations is described by the 
following result. 
Theorem 3. Let m be a market and rm be the coalition-game connected with m. 
Let Jt c X , X=(xt)iEleX, peP, { - {^)MeX, and let ? - Ui(x
l) for all 
i e I. If (X, p) is an ^//-equilibrium then the imputation S, is -//-stable. 
Proof . It follows immediately from (3) and (4) that for aWKeJf is AK(p) c XK. 
If Jt c X, X = (x')iei eX, pe P and (X, p) is an -#-equilibrium then the previous 
inclusion implies 
£ «,(*<) = max { X «,.(/) : F e A ^ ) } ^ max { £ «,</) : F e XK} = „(K) 
i sK feK ifcK 
for all ^ e Jt. Consequently, 
£<r = <*0 
ieiV 
for all K e Jt, and ^ e ; , a s l e Xt. 
The classical result about the relations between core and ./-equilibria is an imme-
diate consequence of the previous Theorem 3 and of Theorem 2 as follows from the 
next statement. 
Corollary 4. Let the assumptions of Theorem 3 be fulfilled and let Jt = J. If 
(X, p) is an ./-equilibrium then £ is Jf"-stable; i.e. £ e Qx = Q. 
The relations represented by previous Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 are formulated 
as implications. These implications can not be, generally, turned into equivalences, 
as there exists a principal difference between market equilibrium and game-theoretical 449 
stability. It follows from the difference between (16) and (20), namely from the fact 
that in case of .///-equilibrium and ^-stability the common profit of coalitions is 
maximized over sets AK(p) and XK, KeJl, respectively. 
However, there exist special assumptions under which the complementary implica-
tion to Theorem 3 can be proved. 
Theorem 4. If p e P, J <= J( <= jf, if 
max {uiy1) : Y = (y')isI e X{i)} = max {M;(y) : Y = (y%sl e A{i)(p)} 
for all i e /, and if X = (x')ieI e X7, £ = (£%, £ E, t' = «,(.*'), i e I, then (A', p) is an 
.//-equilibrium if £ is ./-stable. 
Proof. Let us suppose that X = (x')ieI e X,, p e P , J c Ji c Jf, and that for 
all iel 
(24) Ui(x') = max {«,(/) : Y = (y%, e A{i)(p)} . 
Let us suppose, further, that there exists k e I such that X£ A{k)(p); i.e. 
(25) pxk < pak. 
Because of Xe Xj, the inequality 
Z PX' = Z Pa' 
iel iel 
follows from (3) immediately, and (25) implies that there exists / e / such that px1 < 
< pa1. Let us construct Y = (j'),e, e X such that 
>'o = x'0 + (pa
1 - pxl)jp0 , 
y'j = x'j, J = 1, . . . , m . 
This Y belongs to A{l)(p), as py' = pa
1, and 
U.O0 = u{xl) + 1 (pa1 - px') < u(x<) , 
Po 
which is a contradiction with (24). Consequently, (25) can not be true, and X e A{i)(p) 
for all i e /, if (24) is true for all i e L Let us suppose, now, that £ is J^-stable. Then 
(26) Ui(x
l) = c'' = v({i}) = max {«,(/) : Ye A{i)(p)} 
for all i el. It means that condition (24) is fulfilled and, a s l e X , by assumption, 
also X e A{i)(p) for all i e I. Consequently, (X, p) is an J^-equilibrium and, by Theorem 
2, it is also an ^-equilibrium. 
Corollary 5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, (X, p) is an ^"-equilibrium 
if and only if £ is „#-stable. 
Corollary 6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, if £ is ./-stable then (X,p) is an 
equilibrium in the sense of [4], as follows from Theorem 4 and Corollary 3 if we put 
J( = J. , 
(Received March 14, 1976.) 
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